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SULLIVAN v. UNITED STATES: ARE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDERS IN NEED OF A DEFENSE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the formation of this country's government, federal
courts have recognized, to a certain extent, the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity.' This doctrine prevents individuals injured by an
act or omission of the federal government from suing the govern-
ment.2 In the late nineteenth century, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity expanded its reach by providing immunity for certain
government employees who committed torts during the course of
their employment.3 Thus, these higher-ranking employees who
were granted immunity avoided liability by advancing the evolving
doctrine of official immunity as a defense.4 Due to the develop-
1. See Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE LJ. 1,
37-41 (1926) (explaining that United States courts regarded sovereign immunity
"as a matter of simple logic"); Reginald Parker, The King Does No Wrong - Liability
for Misadministration, 5 VAND. L. REv. 167, 167-69 (1952) (noting sovereign immu-
nity's existence in United States); George W. Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine
of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REv. 476, 480-81 (1953) (explaining that sovereign
immunity exists in United States even though "the keystone of American political
thought has been responsible government"). For further discussion of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, see infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
2. Parker, supra note 1, at 174. Countries such as Germany and France have
abolished the doctrine. Id. at 167 & n.2. In the United States, prior to the enact-
ment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, some states had already established legisla-
tion allowing law suits against the state for state-related tortious acts. H.R. REP. No.
1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1946).
A concept closely related to government liability is the principle of respondeat
superior. Parker, supra note 1, at 168. The theory of respondeat superior
prescribes that an employer is liable for the torts of an employee if such torts were
committed during the course and scope of employment. Merton Ferson, Bases for
Master's Liability and for Principal's Liability to Third Persons, 4 VAND. L. REv. 260, 263
& n.14 (1951). Nevertheless, respondeat superior has historically been held inap-
plicable to the government because if "the king would not be liable had he done
the act himself... it follows that he is not responsible for acts of inferior organs."
Parker, supra note 1, at 168.
3. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (finding Postmaster General im-
mune from suit while performing general duties of employment); Dow v.Johnson,
100 U.S. 158 (1879) (finding United States Army officer not liable "for injuries
resulting from his military orders or acts"); Lamar v. Browne, 92 U.S. 187 (1875)
(granting immunity to United States Treasury Agents acting within scope of
employment).
4. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT, CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS xvii (1983). Existing evidence demonstrates that most government offi-
cials who are sued are the lower, "rank-and-file" employees or the "street-level bu-
reaucrats," such as police officers, schoolteachers and social workers. Id. at xvii-
xviii. However, courts have generally held that higher-ranking employees are im-
(233)
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ment of this doctrine of official immunity, victims of government-
related torts were left with little available relief for tort claims. 5
To remedy the inequity of this situation, Congress enacted the
Federal Tort Claims Act (F-'CA) in 1946, which waived a portion of
the federal government's sovereign immunity.6 Under the FTCA,
the federal government assumed exclusive responsibility, with some
exceptions, for certain types of torts committed by federal employ-
ees acting within the scope of their employment.7 Therefore, the
federal government became the sole defendant in any resulting liti-
mune from liability via the common-law doctrine of official immunity, leaving the
"rank-and-file" employees with the protection of immunity. Id. at xviii.
5. Id. at 37-38. To handle a portion of the suits against the federal govern-
ment and to provide a forum for the claims of government tort victims, the Court
of Claims was established in 1863. Id. Its jurisdiction, however, extended only to
claims against the government based on contract; "tort claims were explicitly
barred." Id. Several decades later, patent infringement cases could be brought
before the Court of Claims, and eventually, the Court of Claims was granted juris-
diction to hear suits involving government ships that committed admiralty and
maritime torts. Id. at 39.
Alternatively, victims could attempt to get a private bill passed through the
legislature, but this process was inefficient and unfair. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1946); see Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1684,
1688-1703 (1966) (providing detailed description of private bill process). For fur-
ther discussion of the history and relevant statistics regarding private bills in Con-
gress, see infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
6. Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1988).
Congress had previously held numerous debates over enacting a bill that would
abrogate a portion of the government's immunity. See WILLIAM B. WRIGHT, THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS Acr 5 (1957) (describing years of "Congressional considera-
tion"). Congressional subcommittees proposed numerous legislative drafts that
were rejected by Congress between 1916 and 1946. Id.; see also LESTER S. JAYSON, 1
HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS §§ 2.01-2.10 (1994) (providing in-depth examina-
tion of century of bills and other legislation considered or enacted relating to gov-
ernment torts); SCHUCK, supra note 4, at 38-39 (same).
For a general overview of the FICA, see Herbert R. Baer, Suing Uncle Sam in
Tort: A Review of the Federal Tort Claims Act and Reported Decisions to Date, 26 N.C. L.
REv. 119 (1948); Irvin M. Gottlieb, The Tort Claims Act Revisited, 49 GEo. L.J. 539
(1961); Irvin M. Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act - A Statutory Interpretation, 35
GEO. L.J. 1 (1946) [hereinafter Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act].
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Section 1346(b) specifically provides that:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts ...
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States... for injury or loss.., caused by the negligent or wrong-
ful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his [or her] office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omis-
sion occurred.
Id. As the statute indicates, state standards determine the scope of employment;
these standards depend on the state in which the tort was committed. Johnson v.
Carter, 983 F.2d 1316, 1322 (4th Cir.) (citing Williams v. United States, 350 U.S.
857 (1955) (per curiam)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 57 (1993).
2
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gation.8 As originally enacted, the FTCA only applied to torts com-
mitted by employees in the executive branch of the government.9
Congress subsequently amended the FTCA by enacting the Federal
Employees Liability and Reform Tort Compensation Act (the
Westfall Act).1° The Westfall Act encompassed acts committed by
employees of the judicial and legislative branches as well as those
committed by executive branch employees.11
In April of 1994, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit was confronted with the task of examining the
boundaries of the Westfall Act in Sullivan v. United States.12 Decid-
ing an issue of first impression, the Seventh Circuit held that the
Westfall Act applied to allegations of malpractice against federal
public defenders - individuals who maintain an adversarial rela-
tionship with the government.13 Thus, the Seventh Circuit inter-
preted the FTCA to mean that the federal government remains the
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (prior to 1988 amendment).
10. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Act (the Westfall Act), Pub.
L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2671-2680).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2671. In 1988, responding to the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1987) (superseded by
statute), Congress amended the FTCA by enacting the Westfall Act. § 2(a) (4), 102
Stat. at 4563. One section of the Westfall Act redefined the term "employee of the
government" as used in the FTCA to encompass any employee of any federal
agency, including those within the legislative and judicial branches. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2671.
The Westfall Act also provided for the substitution of the United States gov-
ernment as sole defendant in all applicable suits against a government employee.
28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1). Under the Westfall Act, no suit could be brought against
the employee in a personal capacity either in state or federal court. Id. The cur-
rent version of § 2679(b) (1) states:
The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and
2672 of this title for injury.., arising or resulting from the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while act-
ing within the scope of his [or her] office or employment is exclusive of
any other civil action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the
same subject matter against the employee whose act or omission gave rise
to the claim or against the estate of such employee. Any other civil action
or proceeding for money damages arising out of or relating to the same
subject matter against the employee or the employee's estate is precluded
without regard to when the act or omission occurred.
Id.
12. 21 F.3d 198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 670 (1994).
13. Id. at 200. The court held "that a federal public defender ... is an 'em-
ployee of the government' for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2671 and that the defender
acts within the scope of that employment when representing his [or her] clients."
Id. Congress created the position of federal public defender in 1970. 116 CONG.
REc. 34,809, 34,811 (1970). Some members of Congress adamantly contested this
position in earlier versions of the Criminal Justice Act, and thus, the position did
not appear in the Criminal Justice Act until after a detailed study was conducted
1995] NOTE 235
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exclusive defendant in malpractice suits against federal public
defenders. 14
Significantly, the Seventh Circuit's holding in Sullivan arguably
rejects the reasoning of two cases previously decided by the United
States Supreme Court. First, Sullivan disregards the Supreme
Court's holding in Polk County v. Dodson.15 In Polk County, the Court
held that a public defender does not act under color of state law
when representing an indigent client.16 The Court in Polk County
was addressing an issue analagous to public defender liability under
the FTCA: public defender liability under the Civil Rights Act of
1964 as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983).17 In deciding the
case, the Supreme Court focused on the antagonistic relationship
between public defenders and the government as well as the simi-
larities between public defenders and private attorneys.' 8 Second,
the holding in Sullivan also ignores similar reasoning articulated in
Ferni v. Ackerman,' 9 where the Supreme Court held that court-ap-
pointed attorneys representing criminal defendants do not have im-
munity from liability.20
Regardless of Supreme Court precedent, if the Seventh Cir-
cuit's reasoning, but not its conclusion, is considered, federal pub-
lic defenders would be immune from suit under the Westfall Act
due to their status as judicial branch employees. However, similar
immunity would not extend to private, court-appointed attorneys
also accused of malpractice when representing an indigent defend-
ant because technically, these court-appointed attorneys are not
employees of the government.2' Finally, it is possible that allowing
such immunity could be detrimental to the quality of representa-
under Congress' mandate in order to determine if the position was necessary. Id.
at 34,813-14 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
14. See Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 206 (concluding that plaintiff's "exclusive remedy
for the [public] defender's alleged malpractice is thus an action against the United
States under the FTCA").
15. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
16. Id. at 324-25. An employee is deemed to be acting under color of law
when functioning for or on behalf of the government. Id. at 317-318 (citing United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
17. Id. at 314.
18. Id. at 318-25. For further discussion of the holding and factual context of
Polk County, see infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
19. 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
20. Id. at 205. For further discussion of the facts and outcome of Ferr, see
infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
21. See Sullivan v. United States, 21 F.3d 198, 201-03 (7th Cir.) (stressing
plain-meaning interpretation of word "employee"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 670
(1994).
[Vol. 40: p. 233
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tion provided to indigent defendants in the future. 22
This Casenote examines the propriety of substituting the
United States as defendant in a legal malpractice suit against a fed-
eral public defender. Part II of this Casenote discusses the origin of
the doctrines of sovereign immunity and official immunity in the
United States and further examines how Congress has acted to di-
minish the effect of these doctrines.23 Part III provides the factual
background of Sullivan and discusses the Seventh Circuit's ration-
ale in deciding Sullivan.24 Part IV argues that the Seventh Circuit
overlooked the reasons for granting immunity and failed to con-
sider a possibly valid exception to the FTCA/Westfall Act: malprac-
tice suits against federal public defenders who are "government
employees" in name only, but certainly not in function, should re-
tain the public defender as defendant. 25 This exception would
hold federal public defenders individually liable for acts or omis-
sions constituting malpractice that they committed while represent-
ing a criminal defendant. Finally, Part V considers the potential
impact of the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Sullivan on future govern-
ment-tort litigation as well as its possible effect on the occupations
of both federal public defenders and private court-appointed de-
fenders.26 Part V also suggests a possible middle-ground approach
that would ensure competent representation for indigent criminals
but not deter individuals from pursuing positions as public
defenders.27
22. See Kenneth S. Schlesinger, Comment, Polk County v. Dodson: Liability
Under Section 1983for a Public Defender's Failure to Provide Adequate Counsel, 70 CAL. L.
REv. 1291, 1303 (1982) (remarking that imposing liability on public defender may
have beneficial effect on quality of counsel). Given the lay society's somewhat hos-
tile reaction to the legal profession in general, extending immunity for public-
defender malpractice would not help assuage any tainted conception of attorneys.
Jeffrey H. Rutherford, Comment, Dziubak v. Mott and the Need to Better Balance the
Interests of the Indigent Accused and Public Defenders, 78 MINN. L. REv. 977, 979 (1994).
23. For a chronological history of the FTCA, analogous legislation and rele-
vant case law, see infra notes 36-80 and accompanying text.
24. For an examination of the factual context and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Sullivan, see infra notes 81-108 and
accompanying text.
25. For a thorough critique of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning and ultimate
conclusions of law, see infra notes 109-54 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the impact of Sullivan, see infra notes 155-67 and ac-
companying text.
27. For a possible solution to the dilemma of federal public defender mal-
practice liability, see infra notes 155-67 and accompanying text.
1995] NOTE
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II. FEDERAL EMPLOYEE/GOVERNMENT LIABILITY
A. Common Law
The belief that "the King c[ould] do no wrong" originated
under English law. 28 The early American colonists carried this be-
lief with them to the New World.2 9 However, as the United States
developed, this maxim frustrated thousands of victims of tortious
acts committed by the United States government through the con-
duct of its employees. 30 This sense of futility increased significantly
as the United States matured because, subsequently, a large major-
ity of the "King's" servants were also considered beyond the reach
of litigation.31 As a result, numerous victims of government-related
negligence were prevented from turning to the courts for relief 3 2
Furthermore, the unwieldy process of obtaining approval and pas-
sage of private legislation for relief increased victims' frustration.33
Congress also experienced aggravation because it seemed that for
every tort victim, there was a corresponding bill for relief needing
consideration. 34 Both the legislature and the people of the United
28. W. BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND, 241-42
(1765). This maxim generally has been held to mean that the government cannot
be sued without its consent. ScHucK, supra note 4, at 30-31. Early colonists
brought with them the English legal concept of sovereign immunity. After the
founding of the United States of America, the doctrine was initially addressed in
1793 when the Supreme Court decided Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (4 Dall.) 419
(1793). WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 1. In Chisholm, the Supreme Court found that the
state of Georgia was amenable to suit, stating that "all men ought to obtain justice,
since in the estimation ofjustice, all men are equal, whether the prince complain
of a peasant or the peasant complain of a prince." Id. at 1 (quotation omitted).
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution effectively reversed
the Chisholm decision by establishing the supremacy of the sovereign. Id. at 1-2.
29. SeeJAsON, supra note 6, § 2.01 (explaining that "[t] he doors of the courts
were closed to [victims] . . . because of the long-established principle, inherited
from the law of England and rigidly adhered to by judicial decisions in [the United
States] ... since its beginning, that no suit may be brought against the sovereign
without his consent").
30. See id. (providing example of frustration and shock of victims of 1946 mili-
tary plane crash into Empire State Building when told government could not be
held responsible).
31. See Parker, supra note 1, at 174-76 (explaining history and rationale be-
hind concept of official immunity).
32. Id.
33. SCHUCK, supra note 4, at 37.
34. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 2-3. In the years immediately preceding the en-
actment of the FrCA, Congress spent a large portion of time addressing these
claims:
In the Sixty-eighth Congress about 2,200 private claim bills were intro-
duced, of which 250 became law.., in the Seventieth Congress 2,268
private bills were introduced... in each of the Seventy-fourth and Sev-
enty-fifth Congresses over 2,300 private bills claims were introduced ....
In the Seventy-sixth Congress approximately 2,200 bills were introduced
238 [Vol. 40: p. 233
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States agreed that Congress needed to take steps to eliminate this
situation.3 5
B. Legislation for the Victims
1. Congress Finally Responds: Enactment of the Federal Tort Claims
Act
To provide a method of obtaining compensation for the vic-
tims and to lighten the burden on the legislature, Congress passed
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1946.36 Through the FTCA,
Congress waived some of the federal government's immunity, ad-
mitting that perhaps the "King and his servants" did do wrong on
occasion.3 7 The FTCA established the exclusive liability of the fed-
eral government for common-law torts committed by government
employees acting within the scope of their employment.38 Thus, no
government employee could be sued individually; the full responsi-
bility of the tort fell on the federal government.39
The FTCA, however, contained numerous exceptions. For in-
stance, claims based on the performance of discretionary acts,
claims alleging intentional torts and claims related to injuries sus-
tained during wartime are examples of situations not covered by
the FTCA, thereby leaving the victims without recourse. 4° Under
... in the Seventy-seventh Congress... 1,829 private claim bills [were]
introduced . . . . In the Seventy-eighth Congress, 1,644 bills were
introduced.
Id. at 3 n.7 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1946)). Two signif-
icant and complementary reasons for the volume of claim bills were the expanding
scope of the federal government's activities and the ever-increasing size of the fed-
eral government's work force. Id. at 4.
35. SeeJAYSON, supra note 6, § 2.02 (1994) (describing "steady stream of grum-
bling, criticism, comment, and debate among the legislators and others concerned
which was destined to continue until the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act
in 1946").
36. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (prior to 1988 amendment).
37. Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 6, at 2.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). For the full text of § 1346(b), see supra note 7.
39. Id.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), (h), (j). The exception generating the most contro-
versy and a significant amount of claims is the discretionary-act exception. JAYSON,
supra note 6, § 249.01. The discretionary-act exception provides, in relevant part,
that:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not
apply to -
(a) Any claim based upon ... the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
Typically, the methods attorneys choose to defend their clients are very much
NOTE
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the FTGA's original form, the liability of the federal government
only extended to employees of agencies within the executive
branch.41 In fact, numerous courts held that the individuals em-
ployed in the judicial branch of the federal government were ex-
cluded from the FTCA; therefore, the federal government could
not be sued for the negligence of judicial employees. 42 Further-
more, based on the common-law doctrine of official immunity, judi-
cial employees were also individually immune from suit because of
the discretion involved in their positions.43 Thus, under the com-
a product of professional judgment and, therefore, could be considered discre-
tionary acts. See Hodges v. Carter, 80 S.E.2d 144, 146 (N.C. 1954) (explaining at-
torney's use of judgment when acting in best interests of client). Recently, the
Supreme Court described the significant characteristic of a discretionary act: "[A]
court must first consider whether the action is a matter of choice for the acting
employee. This inquiry is mandated by the language of the exception; conduct
cannot be discretionary unless it involves an element of judgment or choice."
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). The standard of care applica-
ble to attorneys in malpractice actions requires consideration of whether the attor-
neys exercised their best judgment and made the correct choice in the case. SeeW.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 185-87
(5th ed. 1984) (explaining standard of care for physicians but noting similarity
with that of attorneys). The judgment and choice made are then compared to the
procedure typically followed by others in the profession. Id. Therefore, under the
FTCA's discretionary-act exception, one could argue that the government should
not be subject to liability for a public defender's improper choice of defense strat-
egy. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Consequently, the victim would be left with no rem-
edy. Congress, however, enacted the FITCA to allow victims to recover for injuries
caused by government torts. Baer, supra note 6, at 119-25. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has held that the ultimate prevention of suit against the govern-
ment by the use of an exception to the FTCA does not prohibit granting immunity
to an employee. United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 165 (1991).
However, the situation posed above is highly unlikely because the Court has
been very clear in defining "discretionary acts." See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537-39.
Significantly, the exception only applies when individuals are making a public-pol-
icy decision that affects society as a whole. Id. In contrast, a public defender is
only acting in the best interests of his or her client; he or she is not acting in the
best interests of the public. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981).
Thus, the discretionary-act exception is not applicable to malpractice suits against
federal public defenders. For a review of the purpose behind the FTCA, see supra
notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
41. For a discussion of the limitations of the pre-1988 version of the FTCA,
see supra text accompanying note 9.
42. Sullivan v. United States, 21 F.3d 198, 202-03 (7th Cir.) (citing Cromelin
v. United States, 177 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1949) (finding that FTCA does not
apply to judge and trustee of court), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 944 (1950)), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 670 (1994); Tomalewski v. United States, 493 F. Supp. 673, 675 (W.D. Pa.
1980) (holding that court clerks and judges, as judicial branch employees, are not
covered by FTCA); Foster v. Bork, 425 F. Supp. 1318, 1319-20 (D.D.C. 1977)
(same). But see United States v. LePatourel, 571 F.2d 405, 408-10 (8th Cir. 1978)
(holding that FTCA covered judicial branch employees), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 670
(1994). The Westfall Act effectively superseded the Cromelin, Tomalewski and Foster
decisions.
43. See Foster v. MacBride, 521 F.2d 1304, 1305 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that
8
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mon law, the government and particular government employees re-
tained absolute immunity for any tortious act.44 However, it is
important to recognize that the position of federal public defender
did not exist until the mid-1900s; therefore, the doctrine of official
immunity that developed through the common law for other gov-
ernment employees has never been available as a defense for the
public defender in the absence of FTCA coverage. 45
In the late 1970s and 1980s, case law emerged that provides
guidance on the relationship between the government and an attor-
ney representing a criminal defendant. These cases demonstrate
the Supreme Court's attitude towards granting immunity to defense
counsel.
For example, in 1979, the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of appointed defense counsel's liability for malpractice in Feri v.
Ackerman.46 In Ferri, the Court held that, under federal law, a pri-
vate, court-appointed attorney is not entitled to absolute immunity
in a state malpractice suit even though the attorney received com-
pensation from the federal government; therefore, the attorney was
individually liable. 47 Interestingly, the Court never mentioned or
considered whether the FTCA applied, most likely because the at-
torney involved was not a public defender, but rather a private,
judge was not covered under FTCA but immune nonetheless); Dziubak v. Mott,
503 N.W.2d 771, 774-75 (Minn. 1993) (explaining that independent discretion ex-
ercised by members of judiciary warrants protection).
44. See Parker, supra note 1, at 174 ("Not only is the liability of his [or her]
superior, the Government, strictly limited on the ground of sovereign immunity,
but also his [or her] own liability will be regularly disclaimed because of actual or
imagined reasons of public policy.").
45. Francis P. McCune, Recent Cases, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 724, 727 (1982) (ex-
plaining that because Supreme Court did not acknowledge indigent defendant's
constitutional right to counsel until its decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963), common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity not applicable to
newly-created position of public defender).
46. 444 U.S. 193 (1979). The plaintiff, an indigent, sued his former attorney
in state court alleging that his attorney committed 67 different acts of malpractice
during the indigent's previous federal trial. Id. at 195. A federal judge had ap-
pointed the attorney, Ackerman, to represent the indigent. Id. at 194.
47. Id. at 205. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had determined that federal
law should control whether the defender was granted immunity because the de-
fender was a "participant in a federal proceeding." Id. at 196-97 & n.10 (citations
omitted). The United States Supreme Court agreed that federal law should con-
trol that determination but ultimately reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
finding that federal law provided immunity for a public defender. Id. at 205; see
a/so Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295 (1988) (stating that "the scope of absolute
official immunity afforded federal employees is a matter of federal law, 'to be for-
mulated by the courts in the absence of legislative action by Congress' ") (quoting
Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959)).
1995] NOTE
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court-appointed attorney. 48 Instead, the Court focused on the dif-
ferences between appointed counsel and other judicial employ-
ees. 49 In particular, the Court emphasized the differing loyalties
involved in each occupation.5 0 The Court found that while an ap-
pointed counsel owes the utmost loyalty to his or her client, other
judicial-branch workers "represent the interest of society as a
whole."51 The Court also commented extensively on the similarities
between lawyers appointed to represent indigent defendants and
privately-retained attorneys.5 2 For example, both attorneys are re-
quired to "serve the undivided interests of [their] client[s] ."s In
addition, the Ferni Court noted that both attorneys must act inde-
pendently of, and adversarial to, the government in a criminal
proceeding.54
2. Analogous § 1983 - Color of Law Issues
In addition to the enactment of the FTCA, Congress sought to
provide other avenues of accountability for government tortfeasors
who injure the people of the United States. By enacting § 1983,55
Congress devised a means of compensating victims of injuries
caused by government employees or private individuals acting on
behalf of the government.56 Specifically, Congress mandated that,
under § 1983, a government employee can be held individually lia-
48. Ferri, 444 U.S. at 194.
49. Id. at 202-03. Other members of the judiciary, such as judges and prose-
cutors, require immunity to effectively and efficiently perform their duties. Id. at
202 (citing Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1958)). However, "[t]he primary
rationale for granting immunity to judges, prosecutors, and other public officers
does not apply to defense counsel sued for malpractice by his own client." Id. at
204.
50. See id. at 202 & n.19 (citing to Court's earlier decisions in In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1972), and Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405
(1956), in support of proposition that lawyer has different set of responsibilities
than other government officers).
51. Id. at 203-04.
52. Id. at 204.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
56. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, 1 SECTION 1983 LITIGATION:
CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES § 1.1, at 4 (2d ed. 1991). Federal prisoners like Sulli-
van often use § 1983 to file suits against government officials. Id. § 1.1, at 5. "Dur-
ing the 12-month period ending June 30, 1988, over 24,000 prisoner civil rights
actions.., were filed in federal court." Id. (citation omitted). However, Sullivan's
complaint did not involve § 1983 because "claims of legal malpractice do not
achieve constitutional status solely by virtue of a claimant's status as a defendant in
a criminal proceeding." Brown v. Schiff, 614 F.2d 237, 239 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 94 (1980).
242 [Vol. 40: p. 233
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ble for violating the constitutional or statutory rights of.the plain-
tiff.57 However, this liability attaches only if the employee is acting
under color of state law.58 If the employee is found not to have
acted under color of state law, the employee is then immune from
suit in a § 1983 action.59
In 1981, the Supreme Court considered a § 1983 cause of ac-
tion involving a public defender in Polk County v. Dodson.60 In Polk
County, a criminal defendant sued a county public defender under
§ 1983 alleging that the public defender provided ineffective assist-
ance of counsel in violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights.61 The Court held that a public defender does not act under
color of state law when representing a federal prisoner.62 There-
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity,. or other proper proceeding for redress. For
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
Id.
58. Id. For an analysis of potential plaintiffs, defendants and the procedural
workings of § 1983 litigation, see SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 56.
59. See SCHWARTZ & KiRKLIN, supra note 56, § 5.4, at 253 ("A claim for relief
under § 1983 may be asserted only against persons who acted under color of state
... law."). Additionally, a plaintiff in a potential § 1983 action can seek alternative
remedies such as state administrative remedies. Id. § 10.1., at 589-91. However,
there is no requirement that the plaintiff exhaust these alternative administrative
remedies before commencing a suit in federal court under § 1983. Id. Also, in a
§ 1983 action, the employee can be held personally liable. J. Devereux Weeks,
Personal Liability Under Federal Law: Major Developments Since Monell, in SEcrIoN
1983: SWORD AND SHIELD 295, 301-05 (Robert H. Freilich & Richard G. Carlisle
eds., 1983).
In contrast, the FTCA is an exclusive remedy, and therefore, if the FTCA cov-
ers a particular employee, all threat of personal liability ends for that individual.
28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1988). Furthermore, the FTCA requires that, before instituting
an action against the United States in federal court, the plaintiff must have
presented his or her claim to the appropriate federal agency and been denied
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Indeed, the court in Sullivan v. United States affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the case for precisely this failure to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies. 21 F.3d 198, 206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 670 (1994).
60. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
61. Id. at 314. The county defender moved to withdraw herself as counsel
based on her view that the indigent defendant's grounds for appeal were frivolous.
Id. The defendant argued that this motion to withdraw had violated his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, his Eighth Amendment right to not be subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due pro-
cess. Id. at 315.
62. Id. at 317-18 (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
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fore, the Court dismissed the complaint against the public de-
fender.65 Once again, the Court focused on the function rather
than the form of the office of public defender and determined that
the relationship between a public defender and criminal defendant
does not differ from the relationship between a private attorney
and criminal defendant. 64
Following Polk County, the Supreme Court had an additional
opportunity to analyze the importance of the relationship between
an alleged tortfeasor and the government when it decided another
§ 1983 case, West v. Atkins.65 In West, the defendant was a private
physician who provided medical services to prisoners at a state
prison.66 Relying in part on the physician's contractual relationship
with the state and the physician's cooperation with the government
to achieve a common goal, the Supreme Court held that the physi-
cian was acting under color of state law. 67 The physician was, there-
fore, held personally responsible for any violation of the prisoner's
constitutional rights. 68 The Court made this decision despite the
fact that the physician was technically not an employee of the
government.69
C. The Westfall v. Erwin Decision
The impetus for Congress' decision to put a halt to the poten-
tial liability of rank-and-file government employees, employees in
lower-level government positions, came in January of 1988 with the
case of Westfall v. Erwin.70 In Westfall, the plaintiff sued two civilian
warehouse supervisors of an army depot for negligence. 71 The de-
63. Id. at 325.
64. Id. at 318-24. The Court stated that "[t]his is essentially a private function,
traditionally filled by retained counsel, for which state office and authority are not
needed." Id. at 319; see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 & n.15 (1988) (discuss-
ing relevance of employee's function in determining whether employee is acting
under color of state law); Jeffrey C. Gilbert, In Defense of Public Defenders: Polk
County v. Dodson, 36 U. MIAmv. L. REv. 599 (1982) (explaining Court's develop-
ment of "functions" test as applied in Polk County).
65. 487 U.S. 42 (1988). For further discussion of West, see infra notes 148-53
and accompanying text.
66. Id. at 44.
67. Id. at 56-57.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 44.
70. 484 U.S. 292 (1988) (superseded by statute).
71. Id. at 293. Westfall was injured by toxic soda ash which burned his eyes
and throat upon inhalation. Id. at 294. He alleged that the ash was " 'improperly
and negligently stored' "and that the supervisors had taken no precautions to pre-
vent worker injury. Id.
244 [Vol. 40: p. 233
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fendants were considered employees of the executive branch.72
The Supreme Court held that the FTCA would apply and provide
the supervisors with immunity from personal liability only if they
were acting within the scope of their employment and performing a
discretionary function related to that employment.73 Accordingly,
actions could be brought against the two employees in their per-
sonal capacities unless, upon futher investigation, the actions taken
were within the two employees' scope of duty and of a discretionary
nature.
74
D. Congressional Reaction to Westfall
Alarmed by the possibility of massive litigation against the
"rank-and-file" employees of the federal government as well as indi-
vidual members of Congress due to the Westfall decision, Congress
acted swiftly to amend certain provisions of the FTCA.7s The result-
72. Id. at 293.
73. Id. at 300. "[A]bsolute immunity does not shield official functions from
state-law tort liability unless the challenged conduct is within the outer perimeter
of an official's duties and is discretionary in nature." Id.
74. Id. at 300. The Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded
that the granting of summary judgment was inappropriate because a genuine issue
of material fact regarding the character of the two employees' conduct existed. Id.
75. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act (the
Westfall Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680). Section 2 of the Westfall Act details Congress'
rationale in enacting the legislation. Section 2 provides:
(a) FINDINGS. - The Congress finds and declares the following:
(1) For more than 40 years the Federal Tort Claims Act has been the
legal mechanism for compensating persons injured by negligent or
wrongful acts of Federal employees committed within the scope of their
employment.
(2) The United States, through the Federal Tort Claims Act, is responsi-
ble to injured persons for the common law torts of its employees in the
same manner in which the common law historically has recognized the
responsibility of an employer for torts committed by its employees within
the scope of their employment.
(3) Because Federal employees for many years have been protected from
personal common law tort liability by a broad based immunity, the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act has served as the sole means for compensating per-
sons injured by the tortious conduct of Federal employees.
(4) Recentjudicial decisions, and particularly the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Westfall v. Erwin, have seriously eroded the com-
mon law tort immunity previously available to Federal employees.
(5) This erosion of immunity of Federal employees from common law
tort liability has created an immediate crisis involving the prospect of per-
sonal liability and the threat of protracted personal tort litigation for the
entire Federal workforce.
(6) The prospect of such liability will seriously undermine the morale
and well being of Federal employees, impede the ability of agencies to
carry out their missions, and diminish the vitality of the Federal Tort
Claims Act as the proper remedy for Federal employee torts.
13
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ing amendment was the Federal Employees Liability Reform and
Tort Compensation Act (the Westfall Act).76 Significantly, the
Westfall Act provides that the government is exclusively liable for
torts committed by government employees. 77 Therefore, individual
employees are personally protected from suits brought against
them by the injured party.78 Furthermore, Congress included legis-
lative and judicial personnel in its definition of "federal agency,"
thus protecting these workers from personal liability.79 However,
until 1991, no FTCA case had ever discussed whether the Westfall
Act applied to federal public defenders.80 Thus, the stage was set
for the Seventh Circuit's decision in Sullivan.
III. Sullivan v. United States
A. Facts
In 1991,Joseph E.L. Sullivan sued two federal public defenders
who had previously represented Sullivan in a parole hearing.81 Sul-
livan alleged that the public defenders had committed legal mal-
practice while handling his case.8 2 The federal public defenders
(7) In its opinion in Westfall v. Erwin, the Supreme Court indicated that
the Congress is in the best position to determine the extent to which
Federal employees should be personally liable for common law torts, and
that legislative consideration of this matter would be useful.
(b) PURPOSE. - It is the purpose of this Act to protect Federal employees
from personal liability for common law torts committed within the scope of
their employment, while providing persons injured by the common law torts
of Federal employees with an appropriate remedy against the United States.
Id. § 2, 102 Stat. at 4563-64.
76. The Westfall Act, 102 Stat. 4563.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (1988). For the text of § 2679(b)(1), see supra
note 11.
78. Id.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988) (definitional section of FTCA).
80. Sullivan v. United States, 21 F.3d 198, 201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
670 (1994).
81. Sullivan v. Freeman, 944 F.2d 334, 335 (7th Cir. 1991).
82. Id. Sullivan's parole had been revoked. Id. Sullivan sued the two public
defenders who represented him in the parole hearing alleging malpractice due to
ineffective assistance of counsel under Illinois common law. Id. Sullivan named
the federal public defenders, Freeman and Delworth, as defendants. Id. Sullivan
sought "$250,000 in general damages and $250,000 in punitive damages." Brief
for Appellee United States at 1, Sullivan v. United States, 21 F.3d 198 (7th Cir.)
(No. 93-1364), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 670 (1994). On its initial hearing of the case,
the Seventh Circuit stated that, under Illinois law, the defenders did not possess
absolute immunity from a malpractice suit. Freeman, 944 F.2d at 335. However, the
court mentioned the potential applicability of the Westfall Act, which would pro-
vide immunity for the defenders. Id. On remand, the Attorney General's office, in
compliance with the FTCA, certified that Freeman and Delworth were federal em-
ployees, acting within the scope of their employment for purposes of the malprac-
tice suit. Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 200. The district court reviewed this certification and
14
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claimed immunity as employees of the government. Pursuant to
the FTCA, the'United States District Court for the Southern District
of Illinois substituted the United States as defendant in the suit and
subsequently dismissed the suit.83 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
agreed that federal public defenders were employees of the govern-
ment and, therefore, held that the public defenders were immune
from personal liability due to the applicability of the Westfall Act.84
B. The Seventh Circuit's Rationale in Sullivan
The first issue addressed by the Seventh Circuit was whether a
federal public defender was an employee of the government as con-
templated by Congress when enacting the FTCA.85 To resolve this
issue, the court focused on the definitions provided by the FTCA.86
Section 2671 of the FTCA defines "employees of the government"
to be any employee of a federal agency. 87 Moreover, "federal
agency" is subsequently defined as including employees in the judi-
cial, legislative and executive branches of the federal government.88
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that, because the statute expressly in-
dicates "any" employee, no restriction or exception could be read
into what Congress had clearly and explicitly stated.89
agreed with the Attorney General's determination of the public defenders' em-
ployment status. Id.
83. Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 201.
84. Id. at 201-04. The court stated that no further litigation could be brought
against Freeman or Delworth. Id. at 200. The case was ultimately dismissed with-
out prejudice because Sullivan failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing suit as required by the FTCA. Id. at 206.
85. Id. at 201.
86. Id.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988). According to § 2671, "'[e]mployee of the gov-
ernment' includes officers or employees of any federal agency .... and persons
acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or perma-
nently in the service of the United States, whether with or without compensation."
Id.
88. Id. " 'Federal agency' includes the executive departments, the judicial
and legislative branches, the military departments, independent establishments of
the United States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agen-
cies of the United States, but does not include any contractor with the United
States." Id.
89. Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 203. The Seventh Circuit turned to the language of
Smith v. United States, 499 U.S. 160 (1991), to support this contention. Id. "'No
language in § [2679(b)(1)] or elsewhere in the statute purports to restrict the
phrases [sic] 'any employee of the Government' ....' Id. (quoting Smith v.
United States, 499 U.S. 160, 173 (1991)). However, the Sullivan court's plain-lan-
guage-construction approach is seriously weakened by a recent Congressional bill,
regarding the management of the Presidio Trust. Section 3(c) (1) (D) of the bill
prescribes that the Board of Directors of the Presidio Trust contain 10 individuals
who "are not employees of the Federal Government." H.R. 3433, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess., 140 CONG. Ric. H8634, H8650 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1994). However, in
1995]
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To bolster its opinion, the Seventh Circuit also relied on the
Criminal Justice Act as codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, which autho-
rizes the United States district courts to establish the position of
federal public defender.90 The court held that the language used
in the Criminal Justice Act suggests that a federal public defender
holds typical employee status because the government controls vari-
ous aspects of the federal public defender's office.91 The Sullivan
court grudgingly conceded that the actions of a public defender
were not normally attributable to the government given their ad-
verse relationship. 92 However, in the court's view, that did not mat-
ter because control only seemed to be an issue in the pre-Westfall
Act days.93 For the Seventh Circuit, once the Westfall Act extended
immunity to the judicial branch, the importance of the concept of
control disappeared. 94
The court distinguished the facts in Sullivan from those in Ferni
v. Ackerman, wherein the Supreme Court held that an appointed
§ 3(e) (5), members of the Board of Directors are not considered federal employ-
ees solely because of their status as Board members "except for purposes of the
Federal Tort Claims Act .. " Id. at H8651. Thus, Congress is indicating that
actual "employment status" is not the sole factor determining whether the FTCA
applies. For further discussion of whether a federal public defender functions as a
typical employee, see infra notes 109-34 and accompanying text.
90. Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 202. The CriminalJustice Act mandates that a plan for
representation of indigents be implemented in each United States district court.
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1988). Representation shall be provided by appointed, pri-
vate attorneys for the majority of the cases, but attorneys can also come from a
defender organization. Id. § 3006A(a)(3). Section 3006A(g) (2) (A) describes the
characteristics and responsibilities of a Federal Public Defender Organization. Id.
§ 3006A(g) (2) (A).
91. Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 202 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) (2) (A) (1988)). Spe-
cifically, the court noted the control the judicial branch of the government has
over appointing and removing federal public defenders. Id. The Criminal Justice
Act gives the courts of appeals and the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts (the Director) power to determine the size of the Defender
staff. Id. Another aspect of control significant to the court was that federal public
defenders' salaries are set by the courts of appeals to be commensurate with that
paid to the United States attorney in a comparable jurisdiction. Id. Finally, the
Seventh Circuit noted that the federal public defender's office is required to turn
in periodic activity reports and a proposed budget. Id. The Director then ap-
proves the budget andassumes responsibility for making any necessary payments
on behalf of the Federal Public Defender Organization. Id.
92. Id. The Seventh Circuit quoted the remarks it made in Sullivan v. Free-
man: "'It would be odd to make the federal government answerable for the legal
malpractice of federal public defenders, when the acts constituting malpractice are
beyond the federal government's power to control.' " Id. (quoting Sullivan v.
Freeman, 944 F.2d 334, 336 (7th Cir. 1991)).
93. Id. at 203. "[T]he plain language of the [Westfall) Act must trump any
'control test' in the context of judicial branch employees." Id.
94. Id. For further discussion on the concept of control in any employee-
employer relationship, see infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
248
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attorney lacked absolute immunity under federal law in a state mal-
practice suit.95 The Seventh Circuit placed a great deal of weight
on the Supreme Court's comment in dicta that " 'federal law does
not now provide immunity for court-appointed counsel in a state
malpractice suit.' "96 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the Feni
Court was suggesting that Congress could provide immunity for
court-appointed attorneys and in the Seventh Circuit's opinion,
Congress did just that with the Westfall Act.97
The Seventh Circuit also distinguished Polk County v. Dodson,
wherein the Supreme Court held that a county public defender
when representing an indigent did not act under color of state law
due to the adversarial nature of the public defender's position with
the government.98 Therefore, the defender could not be held lia-
ble under § 1983.99 For purposes of Sullivan, the court said that, in
contrast to a § 1983 suit where a defendant must be acting under
color of law to be liable, an FTCA suit does not require that the
employee be acting under color of law.100 Rather, for substitution
to occur under the FTCA, the defendant must simply be "any em-
ployee of the government." 10 1 With that reasoning, the Seventh
Circuit focused on statements in Polk County and other Supreme
Court cases where the Court stated that a public defender clearly
was an employee of the government.10 2
In his appeal, Sullivan presented a statutory argument postulat-
ing that, if the Westfall Act were to apply, it would effectively repeal
a currently existing statute: specifically, it would repeal the section
95. Id. For a discussion of the Ferri v. Ackerman decision, see supra notes 46-54
and accompanying text.
96. Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 203 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 205
(1979)).
97. See id. at 203 n.9 (acknowledging Supreme Court's invitation to Congress
to set immunity standards for federal employees in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292
(1988)).
98. 454 U.S. 312, 320 (1981). A criminal defendant sued the county public
defender for inadequate representation in an appeal proceeding. Id.
99. Id. at 325.
100. Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 204. The Seventh Circuit did not focus on the argu-
ments or rationale behind the § 1983 decisions but rather concentrated on the
wording used by the courts in numerous cases, including Polk County, in which a
public defender was called "an employee of the government." Id.
101. Id. "[Alny employee" is the exact wording used in the FTCA. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1988). For the full text of § 1346(b), see supra note 7.
102. Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 204 (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 626 (1991) (commenting on employment relationship between public
defender and government); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1009 (1982) (describ-
ing public defender as state employee); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 935-36 n.18 (1982) (same); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 322 n.12
(1981) (stating public defender is county employee)).
NOTE
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of the Criminal Justice Act that provides for the purchase of mal-
practice insurance or the indemnification of federal public defend-
ers.103 Sullivan argued that this would contravene the canon of
construction disfavoring implied repeals of prior statutes. 10 4 The
Seventh Circuit disposed of this argument by citing the Supreme
Court's ruling in United States v. Smith.10 5 In Smith, the Supreme
Court rejected the argument that the Court was impliedly repealing
a portion of the Gonzalez Act, which provided military physicians
with malpractice insurance, or indemnification for negligence, or
both, by finding a military physician immune from liability via the
FTCA. 106 The Smith Court said that the Westfall Act did not repeal
the Gonzalez Act but merely provided another layer of protection
for military physicians.10 7 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit believed
that federal public defenders' immunity via the Westfall Act was
supplemental to the provision for malpractice insurance found in
the Criminal Justice Act. 10 8
103. Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 204. The statute allegedly being repealed was 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(3). This section provides that:
The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
shall... provide representation for and hold harmless, or provide liabil-
ity insurance for, any person who is an officer or employee of a Federal
Public Defender Organization established under this subsection . . . for
money damages for injury, loss of liberty... arising from malpractice...
of any such officer or employee in furnishing representational services
under this section while acting within the scope of that person's office or
employment.
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) (3) (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 417, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17
(1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6165, 6178 (explaining that malpractice in-
surance provision was enacted due to concern regarding Ferni v. Ackerman
decision).
104. Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 204. As the Supreme Court has previously held, " 'It
is, of course, a cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals by implica-
tion are not favored.' " Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661 (1986) (quoting
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976) (citations omitted)).
105. 499 U.S. 160 (1991).
106. Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 204-05 (citing United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160
(1991)). In Smith, the plaintiff was a sergeant whose baby was negligently delivered
by a doctor on the medical staff of the United States Army while stationed in Italy.
Smith, 499 U.S. at 162. The Smith Court focused on whether the Westfall Act "im-
munizes Government employees from suit even when an FTCA exception pre-
cludes recovery against the Government." Id. at 165. The Court held that the
doctor was covered under the FTCA and because the injury occurred abroad, an
exception to the government's liability, the plaintiff could not recover. Id. at 165-
66. The exception referred to in Smith provides that the provisions of the FTCA
shall not apply to "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)
(1988).
107. Smith, 499 U.S. at 172. ("[Tlhe ... [Westfall] Act does not repeal any-
thing enacted by the Gonzalez Act.... (Rather, it] adds to what Congress created in
the Gonzalez Act .... ).
108. Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 205. Using the reasoning of the Court in Smith, the
Seventh Circuit in Sullivan noted that the Criminal Justice Act did not provide the
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V. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. "Employee of the Government" as Intended by Congress
The FTCA states that the government will step in as the de-
fendant in suits arising out of tortious acts committed by "any em-
ployee of the Government while acting within the scope . ..of
employment." 0 9 Proponents of the proposition that a federal pub-
lic defender is an "employee of the Government," as intended by
Congress for purposes of FTCA immunity, point to various factors
for support. For example, the occupation of public defender was
set up by the federal government and the government provides
compensation for public defenders."10 Also, to some extent, a pub-
lic defender's workload is dictated by the government."' While
representing an indigent client, the public defender is performing
exactly the type of work the government anticipated. 112 Therefore,
it is argued that a federal public defender should be immune from
suit. However, even though the federal government decides what
public defenders do and when the work is to be done, a federal
public defender alone controls how to conduct the representa-
tion." 3  The Seventh Circuit also focused on the fact that. the
Westfall Act extended coverage of the FTCA to the judicial
tort victim the right to sue a public defender for malpractice. Id. State common
law provides for that cause of action. Id. The Westfall Act is limiting the victim's
right to sue under state common law, not repealing any right supposedly granted
by the Criminal Justice Act. Id.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
110. See Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (3)-(d) (1988) (authoriz-
ing funds to be taken out of United States Treasury to finance Federal Public De-
fender Organization salaries). However, the Supreme Court has held that
compensation provided via federal funds is not dispositive that Congress intended
the recipient to have immunity from malpractice suits. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S.
193, 201 (1979). The courts of appeals also have the authority to remove any fed-
eral public defender, who may be serving within that particular court's jurisdiction,
from office for cause. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) (2) (A) (1988).
111. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1863 (1994) (discussing
government's control over funding and number of clients funnelled into public
defender's office); Gilbert, supra note 64, at 605 (explaining United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's determination regarding county public de-
fender that "the county could decrease or increase directly the amount of time
that a public defender devotes to a particular case").
112. See Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled
to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 68 IND. L.J. 363, 393 (1993) (stating that
public defender's work is "constitutionally mandated").
113. But see Bright, supra note 111, at 1863. Bright notes that
[T] he notion of government innocence is simply not true in cases involv-
ing poor people accused of crimes. The poor person does not choose an
attorney; one is assigned by a judge or some other government official.
The government may well be responsible for attorney errors when it ap-
19
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branch. 114 It is not the position of this Casenote that all members
of the federal judiciary should be precluded from immunity; this
Casenote simply asserts that the FrCA should not cover federal
public defenders due to their unique "employment" relationship
with the government. 1 5
An employee in the typical sense of the word means an individ-
ual who works under the direction of another." 6 However, profes-
sional standards of attorneys and specifically those of public
defenders, mandate that a public defender shall not be controlled
or directed by the government any more than a private, "non-em-
ployee" attorney. 117 Despite the expansion of the definition of
"federal agency" to include the judicial branch, the concept of con-
trol is still relevant when considering the application of the FTCA
to a federal public defender because of the use of the word "em-
ployee" in the language of the FTCA." 8 Courts have traditionally
held that control is the touchstone used for determining whether
an employer-employee relationship exists." 9 When deciding Sulli-
points a lawyer who lacks the experience and skill to handle the case, or
when it denies the lawyer the time and resources necessary to do the job.
Id.
114. Sullivan v. United States, 21 F.3d 198, 201-02 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct 670 (1994).
115. See Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 202 n.19 (1979) ("[N]othing that
was said.., by this Court places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs,
court clerks or judges.").
116. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 525 (6th ed. 1990). "Employee" is defined as
"[a] person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or im-
plied, oral or written, where the employer has the power or right to control and
direct the employee in the material details of how the work is to be performed."
Id.; see Ferson, supra note 2, at 271-72 (discussing "right-to-control" test in deter-
mining whether master-servant relationship exists).
117. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 327-28 (1981) (Burger, CJ.,
concurring) ("A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or
pays him [or her] to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his [or
her] professional judgment in rendering such legal services.") (quoting MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILry DR 5-107(B) (1976))); ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.3(a) - Professional
Independence, 13 (3d ed. 1992) ("The [public defender] plan and the lawyers
serving under it should be free from political influence and should be subject to
judicial supervision only in the same manner and to the same extent as are lawyers
in private practice.").
118. For a review of the meaning of the word "employee," see supra note 116.
119. See Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1962)
(discussing existence of control in employer-employee relationship); Cape Shore
Fish Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 961, 964 (Ct. Cl. 1964) ("The touchstone for
determining the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship is, of
course, whether the person performing the services 'for another is subject to the
other's control or right to control."); Aviles v. Kunkle, 765 F. Supp. 358, 363 (S.D.
Tex. 1991) (listing control as factor to be considered when deciding whether indi-
vidual is employee), vacated on other grounds, 978 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1992). But see
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van, however, the Seventh Circuit evidently failed to recognize the
appropriate scope of the word "employee."
In the case of a federal public defender, this requisite element
of control by the government as "employer" does not exist or, if so,
is not sufficient. "Employee is synonymous with the word ser-
vant."120 Because an attorney maintains strict loyalty to the individ-
ual he or she is representing at a given time, a public defender
cannot be a servant of the government.' 21
Also significant to the meaning of employee as used in the
FTCA is the dichotomy caused by extending immunity to a federal
public defender based on a broad interpretation of the word em-
ployee. According to the Seventh Circuit, a federal public defender
will be immune from suit for malpractice. 12 2 However, when apply-
ing the broad-interpretation approach to a private, court-appointed
attorney performing exactly the same job, the private attorney
would not be covered because that attorney is technically not an
employee of the government. 23 Congress and the courts have
taken great pains to ensure and insist that federal public defenders
are, in fact, identical to private, court-appointed attorneys. 124
Congress' efforts can be revealed through an examination of
the initial reasoning behind the grant of immunity to federal em-
ployees. Such an examination is helpful in determining the in-
Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1948) (explaining that, although con-
trol is characteristic of employer-employee relationship, "employees are those who
as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they
render service").
120. BLAC'S LAw DIGrIONARY 525 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Tennessee Valley Ap-
pliances v. Rowden, 146 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940)).
121. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 626 (1990) ("[A] de-
fense lawyer is not, and by the nature of his [or her] function cannot be, the
servant of an administrative superior." (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S.
312, 321 (1981))).
122. Sullivan v. United States, 21 F.3d 198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 670
(1994).
123. But see United States v. LePatourel, 571 F.2d 405, 408 (8th Cir. 1978)
(explaining that, because Congress "inclusively rather than exclusively" defined
"employees of the government," broad interpretation should be given to FTCA);
WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 7 (stating that "most of the Circuit courts and some of the
District courts that have considered the question have held that the [FTCA]
should receive a liberal construction in view of its benevolent purpose"); Gottlieb,
The Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 6, at 11 (characterizing definition of "em-
ployee of the government" as having broad scope).
124. See Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 199-200 n.16 (1979) (discussing con-
cern of Congress that having federal public defenders would be tantamount to
placing prisoner's constitutional rights solely in hands of attorneys appointed and
compensated by federal government and, therefore, stressing need of public de-
fenders to "share as much of retained counsel's characteristic independence" as
possible (citing 110 CONG. Rc. 18,558 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Moore))).
1995] NOTE
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tended boundaries of the FTCA. The legislative history of both the
original FTCA and the subsequent Westfall Act indicates that the
immunity was granted so that federal employees would not fear per-
forming routine or discretionary functions during the course of em-
ployment. 125 Specifically, Congress was concerned that the fear of
liability would affect the "morale and well-being" of federal employ-
ees and have a detrimental effect on performance. 126 However, the
Supreme Court has stated that this fear should not impinge on the
performance of an attorney when representing a criminal defend-
ant.127 Although Congress, in effect, overruled Westfall the exam-
ples that Congress provided of erring employees involved strictly
lower-level employees, not employees like federal public defenders
who are also subject to a professional code of ethics and
standards. 128
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court in Ferri
v. Ackerman was inviting Congress to change the FTCA to encom-
pass federal public defenders.' 29 The Seventh Circuit held that, by
expanding the definition of "employee" to include those persons
working in the judicial branch, Congress acted on the Supreme
125. 134 CONG. REc. H4718-03 (daily ed. June 27, 1988) (explaining that it is
important "to restore a sense of security to hard working and dedicated people
who work for this Federal Government") (remarks of Rep. Frank).
126. The Westfall Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679(b), (d)). The Westfall Act was enacted
in response to the Westfall v. Erwin decision. Id. Indeed, the Westfall Court's ra-
tionale for providing immunity to judges and prosecutors was not to "protect an
erring official, but to insulate the decisionmaking process from the harassment of
prospective litigation." Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295 (1988) (superseded by
statute).
127. Fer/, 444 U.S. at 204. The Court in Ferri stated:
The fear that an unsuccessful defense of a criminal charge will lead to a
malpractice claim does not conflict with performance of that function. If
anything, it provides the same incentive for appointed and retained coun-
sel to perform that function competently. The primary rationale for
granting immunity to judges, prosecutors, and other public officers does
not apply to defense counsel sued for malpractice by his [or her] own
client.
Id. (footnote omitted).
128. See H.R. REp. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5946 (providing examples such as suits for clerical negligence,
suits against maintenance personnel and suits against park rangers); see also Wil-
liam T. Cornell, Note, An Evaluation of The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort
Compensation Act: Congress' Response to Westfall v. Erwin, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 137,
138 (1989) (explaining that Westfall Act was response to exposure of "lower level
employees to ruinous personal liability").
129. Sullivan v. United States, 21 F.3d 198, 203 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 670 (1994). The Seventh Circuit, in dicta, stated that "the [Fern] Court sug-
gested that Congress may be justified at some future point in providing immunity
to court-appointed defense counsel." Id.
254 [Vol. 40: p. 233
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Court's invitation in Ferni. 30 However, the Supreme Court in Ferni
specifically referred to court-appointed counsel, not federal public
defenders.131 Furthermore, the Supreme Court was referring to
the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, not the FTCA.132 In fact, the
FTCA was not even addressed. Also, in Ferni, the Supreme Court
adamantly stressed the differences between an attorney represent-
ing a criminal defendant and other officers of the court.' 33 The
position of federal public defender was established in the Criminal
Justice Act; therefore, if Congress wanted to provide immunity for
those individuals, Congress could have amended that Act.134
B. Federal Public Defender as Adversary,
Independent Contractor, or Both
A consideration of the adversarial nature of the federal public
defender's relationship with the government and the position's sim-
ilarities to an independent contractor lends further support to the
proposition that the F'CA should not provide immunity to federal
public defenders. Typically, government employees work in con-
junction with the federal government. 3 5 All of the examples pro-
vided by Congress in the legislative history of the Westfall Act relate
to jobs where the employee's relationship with the government is
one of cooperation.13 6 In contrast, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly emphasized that a public defender does not act for, or on be-
130. Id.
131. Ferr, 444 U.S. at 199.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 202.
134. See id. at 199-200 ("Congress' attempt to minimize the differences be-
tween retained counsel and appointed counsel is more consistent with the view
that Congress intended all defense counsel to satisfy the same standards of profes-
sional responsibility and to be subject to the same controls."). The Ferri Court also
noted that the legislative history of the Criminal Justice Act, as amended in 1970,
did not indicate a Congressional preference for immunity of federal public de-
fenders. Id. at 200 n.16. Furthermore, Congress has enacted immunity statutes
expressly for Defense Department attorneys, but no comparable statute exists for
federal public defenders. See 10 U.S.C. § 1054 (1988). But see United States v.
Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 173 (1990) (explaining that Congress would have indicated if
it only wanted FTCA to apply to employees who did not have existing statutory
immunity). However, in the debates of the Westfall Act, proponents for the Act
commented on the potential "devastating impact on individual civil servants' pock-
etbooks." 134 CONG. REc. S15,214 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1988) (remarks of Sen.
Grassley). A federal public defender's pocketbook would not necessarily be af-
fected, as the Criminal Justice Act provides for malpractice insurance. See 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(3) (1988).
135. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1987) (explaining that, due to public
defender's adversarial role, defender "differs from the typical government
employee").
136. See 134 CONG. REG. S15,214 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1988) (providing examples
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half of, the government because of the adversarial nature of their
relationship. 13 7 Furthermore, as a lawyer with ethical responsibili-
ties, the public defender is required to independently and fervently
advocate the interests of his or her client, regardless of the govern-
ment's interests138
In fact, one may view a federal public defender as being similar
to an independent contractor of the government.13 9 An independ-
ent contractor is an individual or company who performs an act for
another while retaining control over his or her own actions.1 40 The
of potential suits against police officers, postal workers, armed forces employees
and secretaries) (remarks of Sen. Grassley).
137. Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 642 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). "When performing adversarial functions during trial,
an attorney for a private litigant acts independently of the government .... " Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); see Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2361 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[Ojur decisions specifically establish that criminal de-
fendants and their lawyers are not government actors when they perform tradi-
tional trial functions."); United States v. Robinson, 553 F.2d 429, 430 (5th Cir.
1977) (rejecting plaintiff's contention that federal public defender system was un-
constitutional due to government involvement by stating that "[public defenders]
function independently of any agency of the Government and in a truly adversary
action"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978).
138. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Stan-
dard 5-1.3 - Professional Independence, 16 (3d ed. 1992). The Standards stress
that full-time public defenders be completely independent and use their bestjudg-
ment in their representation of clients. Id.; see Edmondson, 500 U.S. at 641 (1990)
(O'Connor, J, dissenting) ("[A] lawyer, when representing a private client, cannot
at the same time represent the government."). But see West, 487 U.S. at 52 (empha-
sizing that, simply because individual has professional obligations and related code
of ethics, individual is not precluded from acting under color of state law).
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1957). Section 2 of the Re-
statement provides:
An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do
something for him [or her] but who is not controlled by the other nor
subject to the other's right to control with respect to his [or her] physical
conduct in the performance of the undertaking. He [or she] may or may
not be an agent.
Id.
140. Ferson, supra note 2, at 272. The Second Restatement of Agency lists
nine factors to consider when determining if an individual is a servant (employee)
or an independent contractor:
(a) the extent of control which . . . the master may exercise over the
details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation
or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether . .. the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist with-
out supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the work[er] supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment... ;
256 [Vol. 40: p. 233
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FTCA specifically excludes from coverage any contractor with the
United States.141 Therefore, an independent contractor is person-
ally liable for any tort committed during the course of employ-
ment.142  Given the role of the federal public defender, the
characterization of such an individual as an independent contrac-
tor seems appropriate. 43
C. Section 1983 and Color of Law Analogy
As noted earlier, courts have often compared actions brought
under the FTCA to § 1983 actions. The Supreme Court has held
that a public defender does not act under color of state law when
defending a client and, therefore, cannot be sued tinder § 1983. 44
This is due to the atypical, adversarial relationship the public de-
fender holds with the government. 45 In a FTCA suit, because a
public defender is an "employee of the government," the Seventh
Circuit considered the defender individually immune from suit.146
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1957).
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988). The definition of "federal agency" as used in
the FTCA "does not include any contractor with the United States." Id.
142. Id.
143. Sullivan v. Freeman, 944 F.2d 334, 336 (7th Cir. 1991). In Freeman, the
Seventh Circuit in its initial review of this case acknowledged the similarities
shared by a federal public defender and an independent contractor. Id. "[A] fed-
eral public defender is functionally an independent contractor rather than an em-
ployee ...... Id. Pennsylvania courts have also remarked on the similarities
between the two. See Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 738 (Pa. 1979). For exam-
ple, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that "[tihe relationship between the
[government] and the public defender is similar to that between an independent
contractor and the party contracting for his [or her] services." Id. (noting same
characterization found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 223 cmt. a). See
also Veneri v. Pappano, 622 A.2d 977, 978 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (stating that "once
a public defender is assigned to assist a criminal defendant, his [or her] public
functions cease"), appeal denied, 641 A.2d 589 (Pa. 1994).
144. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1981). Significantly, the
Polk County ruling effectively overruled the Seventh Circuit's previous holding in
Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401, 408 (7th Cir. 1978), that a public defender
does, in fact, act under color of state law. The Seventh Circuit had been the first
court of appeals to so hold. Id.
145. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In fact, the Supreme Court al-
luded to the unique relationship between the public defender and the govern-
ment when the Court described Polk County as "the only case in which this Court
has determined that a person who is employed by the State and who is sued under
§ 1983 for abusing his [or her] position in the performance of his [or her] as-
signed tasks was not acting under color of state law." Id. at 50.
146. Sullivan v. United States, 21 F.3d 198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 670
(1994).
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It appears that Congress and the courts are providing federal public
defenders with a win-win situation. Public defenders will not be
held personally liable for constitutional rights violations under
§ 1983 because they do not act under color of law, nor will they be
personally liable under the FTCA because they qualify as an "em-
ployee of the government."147 In both FTCA and § 1983 cases, fed-
eral public defenders are performing identical functions, yet, for
arguably contradictory reasons, will never be personally liable for
negligent acts or omissions constituting malpractice.
Moreover, a review of the reasoning used by the Supreme
Court when finding that certain individuals were acting under color
of state law while finding others were not is also enlightening. In
1987, the Court in West v. Atkins held that a private doctor who
contracted with a state prison hospital to provide medical services
was acting under color of state law for § 1983 purposes. 148 In con-
trast, six years earlier, the Court in Polk County had determined that
a private court-appointed attorney was not acting under color of
state law. 149 Justifying its decision, the Court in West explained that,
unlike a public defender, a private doctor was not acting in an ad-
versarial role to the government and that the services provided by
the physician could only be effectively rendered if the government
administrators and the physician cooperated. °50 Once again, the
Court stressed the importance of the adversarial aspect of employ-
ment and how that differentiates public defenders from typical gov-
ernment employees. 151
The West Court also agreed with the lower court's dissent, find-
ing that a private physician is functionally no different from a state
physician who acts under color of state law.' 52 Presumably, func-
147. Id. at 202-04.
148. West, 487 U.S. at 43-44. Atkins was a private physician who, under con-
tract with the state, provided orthopedic services for state prisoners on a regular
basis. Id. at 44. Atkins was paid $52,000 per year for providing these services. Id.
Atkins also maintained a private practice. Id. at 44 n.1. Prisoner West alleged that
Atkins had negligently treated injuries sustained by West while at the prison. Id.
149. For a review of the decision in Polk County, see supra notes 60-64 and
accompanying text.
150. West, 487 U.S. at 51. " 'The provision of health care is a joint effort of
correctional administrators and health care providers, and can be achieved only
through mutual trust and cooperation.'" Id. (citation omitted). The Court also
indicated that the official standards for health services in prisons required a com-
bined effort of state officials and health care providers. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 55-56. The West Court stated:
It is the physician's function within the state system, not the precise terms
of his [or her] employment, that determines whether his [or her] actions
can fairly be attributed to the State. Whether a physician is on the state
[Vol. 40: p. 233
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tion is more significant than form in any analysis regarding the em-
ployment relationship between an individual and the government.
Therefore, a functional analysis should not be ignored in a FTCA
case.153 However, that is exactly what the Seventh Circuit chose to
do in Sullivan.154
V. A SOLUTION TO THE IMMUNITY OR No IMMUNITY DILEMMA
Numerous arguments can be made for both sides regarding
the issue of immunity for federal public defenders. Providing fed-
eral public defenders with immunity would be beneficial because it
would encourage more individuals to pursue careers as federal pub-
lic defenders.15 5 Assuming that the immunity of county public de-
fenders would parallel that of federal public defenders, highly-
qualified individuals might be enticed to accept a county defender
position, an occupation which currently suffers from a lack of
highly-qualified attorneys due partly to poor compensation. 156
Conversely, ensuring competent behavior on the part of the
public defender justifies the denial of immunity. 157 If public de-
fenders are not personally liable for malpractice, the quality of
payroll or is paid by contract, the dispositive issue concerns the relation-
ship among the State, the physician, and the prisoner.
Id.
153. But see Brief for Appellee United States at 14, United States v. Sullivan, 21
F.3d 198 (7th Cir.) (No. 93-1364), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 670 (1994) (recognizing
Department of Justice belief that term "employee" should not be concerned with
function of alleged employee).
154. Sullivan v. United States, 21 F.3d 198, 202-04 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 670 (1994).
155. Cf Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 201 n.17 (1979) (recognizing that
Court had seen no empirical evidence suggesting that risk of malpractice deterred
private attorneys from agreeing to represent criminal defendants); Rutherford,
supra note 22, at 1010 n.201 (noting that immunity is not always supported by
public defenders and may be considered "philosophically repugnant").
Several state courts have granted immunity to public defenders. See, e.g., Dzi-
ubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 774-777 (Minn. 1993); Ramirez v. Harris, 773 P.2d
343 (Nev. 1989); Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
Contra Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871 (Conn. 1975); Reese v. Danforth, 406
A.2d 735 (Pa. 1979).
156. See Ferri 444 U.S. at 204-05 (commenting that, by providing immunity to
avoid defending "groundless malpractice claims," more competent attorneys
would be willing to represent criminal defendants); Nancy L. Schulze, Recent Cases,
50 U. CIN. L. REv. 212, 220 (1981) (explaining Eighth Circuit's finding that immu-
nity is needed to attract qualified attorneys).
157. Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice, Professional Discipline, and Representation
of the Indigent Defendant, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 1171, 1201 (1988). However, attorneys
will always be subject to potential disbarment proceedings or other penalties ad-
ministered by the bar association. McCune, supra note 45, at 729 (citing Black v.
Bayer, 672 F.2d 309, 320 (3d Cir. 1982)). Unfortunately, disciplinary actions will
not always compensate an injured victim. Rutherford, supra note 22, at 991.
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assistance of counsel for indigent defendants in some instances will
be grossly inadequate.158 A compromise to these two extremes
would be to grant limited liability to federal public defenders.1 59 In
this way, the public defender would be personally accountable for
acts of malpractice or other professional negligence, but could es-
cape liability for other torts committed in the more mundane and
typical government employee aspects of the position. For example,
a federal public defender is responsible for hiring and firing assis-
tant federal public defenders as well as support staff.' 60 Under the
compromise position, any tort suit relating to this function would
allow the substitution of the government as defendant.
The court in Sullivan stated that it believed that immunity
under the FTCA would also be granted to appointed counsel.1 61
However, using the Sullivan court's plain-language approach to in-
terpreting the FTCA, this extension of immunity does not seem
possible given that the Westfall Act only grants immunity to employ-
ees and a court-appointed defender does not fit within the plain
definition of "employee."1 62 Importantly, the Criminal Justice
Act 163 and its legislative history 164 continuously stress the need to
maintain the involvement of the private sector of the bar in the
defense of indigents. When two attorneys perform identical func-
tions, allowing one to be free from malpractice liability while the
other remains liable is patently unfair. The compromise proposed
158. See Bright, supra note 111, at 1857-61 (describing atrocities that occur in
defense representation, such as attorney drug dependency and unpreparedness).
159. Cf Delbridge v. Office of Pub. Defender, 569 A.2d 854, 856 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1989) (discussing New Jersey's comparable government-tort statute,
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to 59:10-4 (West 1995), and holding that government
"attorneys have immunity from suit except for legal malpractice, conspiracy or
other intentional misconduct"); Gilbert, supra note 64, at 613 (suggesting qualified
immunity approach in § 1983 cases).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) (2) (A) (1988).
161. Sullivan v. United States, 21 F.3d 198, 203 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 670 (1994). Three years earlier, the Seventh Circuit had indicated that there
was no reason for treating federal public defenders differently: "[T] he differences
between court-appointed counsel, on the one hand, and retained counsel, on the
other, are too slight to justify granting absolute immunity to the one while expos-
ing the other to malpractice liability to his [or her] client with no immunity at all."
Sullivan v. Freeman, 944 F.2d 334, 338 (1991).
162. Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 202-04.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (3) (1988). "Private attorneys shall be appointed in
a substantial portion of the cases." Id.
164. 116 CONG. REc. 34,809, 34,814 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff). "Research
and study indicate that it is essential to maintain the interest and participation of
the local attorneys and at the same time provide a full-time defender organization
that would augment resources and efforts of the private assigned counsel systems
in overburdened jurisdictions." Id.
260 [Vol. 40: p. 233
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss1/5
1995]
herein might be one way to level the playing field for the two types
of attorneys charged with defending indigents and, consequently,
deflect any potential protest from the private sector.
A final concern is that, understandably, plaintiffs would proba-
bly rather sue the government than a private individual in the
hopes of reaching into the "deep pocket" of the federal govern-
ment for redress as opposed to the likely empty pocket of a federal
public defender.1 65 However, § 3006A(g) (3) of the Criminal Jus-
tice Act provides for the purchase of malpractice insurance cover-
ing federal public defenders. 166 Therefore, the federal public
defender's pocket would not be totally empty if it were filled with
malpractice insurance. Similarly, when a private, court-appointed
attorney is sued by a client, the private attorney's malpractice insur-
ance would theoretically cover any adverse judgment. A federal
public defender could significantly mitigate his or her financial
damage by purchasing additional malpractice insurance similar to
the insurance obtained by a private attorney. Accordingly, the be-
lief that federal public defenders should be treated as identical to
private defenders in all aspects of their professional practice would
be preserved.1 67
Jane M. Ward
165. Cornell, supra note 128, at 151. The advantage of the exclusivity feature
of the Westfall Act is that the government is able to pay any adverse judgment as
opposed to a large majority of individuals who would not have that ability. Id.
Given that indemnification exists for the federal public defender under the Crimi-
nal Justice Act, one commentator believes that" 'immunity is not only unnecessary
but also undesired.'" Rutherford, supra note 22, at 1010 n.201.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(3) (1988).
167. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1979).
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